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24 October 1973

DCI BRIEFING FOR 24 OCTOBER WSAG MEETING

THE MIDDLE EAST

I. Some light ground skirmishing has continued on the Egyptian front today following the latest cease-fire that was to be effective as of 0100 this morning. Syria, as well as Egypt and Israel, announced acceptance of the UN resolution. Syria and Egypt conditioned their acceptance upon complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.

State Department review completed

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- B. Israeli advances since Monday have been mainly confined to the Suez City area, where they claim to have isolated the southern concentration of Egyptian forces on the east bank.
 - On the west bank the Israelis claim control of a broad area from a point about
 miles east of Ismailia, south to
 Jabal al Jufrah, and roughly southeast
 to the outskirts of Suez City.
- C. Tel Aviv admits that the Egyptian control two areas along the east bank to a depth of up to six miles. In the north the Egyptians hold a sector extending from a point east of Ismailia north to the marsh region southeast of Port Said. The southern sector extends from a point east of the southern tip of Great Bitter Lake south to Port Tawfiq, opposite Suez City.
- II. On the Syrian front, neither side advanced significantly after Monday's short-lived cease-fire,

and we have noted no action this morning.

- A. Last night, Israeli Saar-class missile boats shelled the ports of Baniyas and Latakia.

 Small fedayeen units were active near the Golan Heights. Air activity was limited to defensive patrols and reconnaissance flights.
- B. The Israelis claim control of all territory from the summit of Mount Hermon southeast through Sasa and extending to a point east of Tell Aantar, and then west to the 1967 cease-fire line.
 - There is no evidence that any Syrian forces remain intact within this area and are still offering resistance.
- III. Last night's cease-fire resolution should bring
 UN observers quickly into place. It requested
 the Secretary-General to dispatch UN observers
 to the Egyptian front.
 - A. Three observer teams were being sent immediately to the west bank of the Suez Canal;
 Egypt has approved their deployment.
 - B. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan is scheduled to meet today with a UN representative to discuss placement of observers along

the east bank.

- Some UN observer teams have remained on the Syrian front throughout the war.
- We have some reports of sharply critical attitudes IV. toward the cease-fire in Egypt.
 - Newsweek senior editor De Borchgrave has Α. told the US Interests Section in Cairo that Egyptian troops at all levels have bitterly protested Sadat's decision. De Borchgrave was in Qantara on Monday, and says that within minutes of the time when the first cease-fire went into effect, the entire town erupted with firing from virtually every direction. He calls it a 45-minute mutiny within the Egyptian army.
 - The Egyptian area commander reportedly halted the aimless firing only by threatening to mortar any troops who continued to fire.

B.

majority of Egyptians appeared critical of the first cease-fire agreement. This included most senior government and army figures.

1. Most are said to believe that Egypt will lose tactical military advantage. Almost no one believes that the US, the USSR, or anyone else can bring Israel to give up occupied territories.



- VII. It is not yet clear just what effect the UN resolutions and cease-fire will have on oil embargos and production cuts previously ordered or contemplated.
 - A. Saudi Arabia is the only producer thus far reported to have given its oil companies instructions on how to proceed.
 - 1. The combined Saudi cutback and embargo, if not reconsidered in light of the UN resolutions, will amount to a 25 percent decline from planned production by November 30.
 - 2. If other Arab countries go through with their announced embargo of oil to the US, it could mean about a ten percent cutback in the level of current US consumption.

- B. US Embassy contacts in Riyadh indicate that the Saudi government wishes to minimize the damage to US-Saudi relations. On the other hand, it may feel compelled to increase pressure on the US if the UN resolution fails to effect an Israeli withdrawal from at least some Arab lands—or if renewed fighting results in serious setbacks for Arab forces.
 - 1. The nationalization of ARAMCO is probably high on the Saudis' list of possible further moves.